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BRAZIL'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY: THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS 
OF SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Soft power1 is an international relations concept based on the assumption that a country gains 
power by constructing or maintaining an 'attractive' image. This positive image influences a state's 
decision such that 'If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will 
encounter less resistance to its wishes' (Nye 1990, 169). This legitimacy is gained through 
attraction rather than coercion (Nye 2008, 2011). While soft power applies to all kinds of powers, 
it is particularly relevant for middle powers. Patience (2014) explains that 'where a state has 
relatively limited military and economic capacity but is nonetheless successful in having its 
imagining recognised and respected beyond its borders, it may accrue degrees of influence and 
authority among its neighbours that even reach into global forums' (2013, 3). To assert their power, 
middle powers use recognition and legitimacy. This represents the major difference between great 
and middle powers: the first traditionally use their coercive capabilities, while the second tend to 
favour the use of soft power (Gratius 2007). However, in its empirical application, academics have 
pointed to the misunderstandings that have arisen from varying conceptualisations of soft power, 
ranging from the resources used, the results obtained, and changes in a subject’s perception or an 
agent’s behaviour (Vuving 2009, Kearn 2011, Hayden 2012).  
Because of its societal and economic circumstances and its aspirations on the international scene, 
Brazil has been referred to as a middle power2 (Patience 2014) or more accurately an emerging 
middle power (van der Westhuizen 2012) or even a middle global power (Malamud 2011). Gratius 
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(2007) explains that 'Brazil's rejection of hard power is based on the conviction that it cannot 
operate alone, but it needs to create alliances with other countries to reach its objectives' (2007, 
24). While Brazil's efforts to improve its reputation have not been that successful at the regional 
level, as evidenced by the rivalries in the region (Malamud 2001, Malamud and Rodriguez 2013), 
recently it has acquired an international reputation (Malamud 2011) through the use of alliances3. 
Various scholars looking at Brazilian foreign diplomacy generally agree that Brazil is using two 
platforms to foster its soft power, namely increasing its participation in the international scene and 
giving a voice to developing countries by reinforcing alliances and cooperation between Southern 
countries (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, de Almeida 2008, White 2010, Hirst 2012, Ayllon 
2012a, Silva and Andriotti 2012). Indeed, during President Lula da Silva's administration, Brazil’s 
international presence was characterised by its increased participation in multilateral institutions, 
the creation of new alliances, the construction of a united South America (Saraiva 2007) and its 
involvement in development cooperation and humanitarian missions (Vigenani and Cepaluni 2007, 
Ayllon 2010, Soares de Lima and Castelan 2012, Inoue and Costa Vaz 2012, Christensen 2013).  
Special attention was given to South–South Cooperation, which became a fundamental aspect of 
Brazil’s foreign policy (MRE 2010b). To raise its profile internationally, Lula's government 
encouraged its diplomats and development actors to promote South–South Development 
Cooperation (SSDC) projects (Silva and Andriotti 2012, Burges 2014a). As the Brazilian Foreign 
Ministry (MRE) declared: 'The technical cooperation 4  developed by Brazil was expanded 
following the guidelines of the policy of strengthening South–South dialogue as an instrument of 
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's government's foreign policy. This cooperation aims to strengthen 
bilateral relations between Brazil and the rest of the world, raising the country's profile on the 
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world stage’5 (MRE 2010a, Chapter 7.1.1). The increase in SSDC projects was therefore a foreign 
policy strategy for Brazil to gain soft power, as they contributed to 'raising the country's profile'.  
But how exactly did Brazil conceive its international interventions, specifically its SSDC, in order 
to obtain a positive image for itself? And how important is the search for 'soft power' to Brazilian 
development cooperation policy? 
Apart from annual reports from a few multilateral institutions that provide an overview of Brazilian 
cooperation projects, there is little information about how Brazilian cooperation is used as an 
instrument of its foreign policy (Ayllon 2010). This is due to the fact that there is little literature 
about Brazilian SSDC (Milani 2012) in general, and also that very few studies have been carried 
out on its foreign policy, especially in the English-language academic literature (Dauvergne and 
Farias 2012). While there have been studies highlighting the relationship between Brazil's 
technical cooperation and its foreign policy (Abdenur 2007, Cabral and Weinstock 2010, Puente 
2010, Giacolone 2013), few have informed their analysis with soft power or contributed to the 
theoretical development of emerging countries' motivations (such as Brazil's) in participating in 
SSDC (Burges 2014a).  
To address this gap in the literature, this article uses policy reports, official documents, interviews 
and the academic literature, working on the assumption that they all reflect what the Brazilian 
government is seeking to promote in its foreign policy. In addition to its analysis of the SSDC 
projects' scope and location, the article analyses the concept of development cooperation as 
described by the persons interviewed for this article and in official documents, as well as critically 
assesses the official narrative on SSDC. Thus the goal of this article is not to assess the 
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effectiveness of Brazil’s foreign policy but to reflect on the Brazilian government’s understanding 
of it.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in January 2013 with officials and development actors6 
in Brazil in order to build upon the limited quantitative data available on Brazil’s SSDC activities. 
Indeed, data on development cooperation is scarce. This scarcity (Puente 2010) has been explained 
by the opacity (Rowlands 2008), or irregularity and superficiality (Pimont Berndt 2009, SEGIB 
2009, Betancourt and Schulz 2009), of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) when it comes 
to publishing information about its activities. The only two existing official reports7 on Brazilian 
SSDC were published respectively in 2010 and 2013 by the Brazilian Institute for Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA), a federal public foundation linked to the Strategic Affairs Secretariat 
of the Presidency. Both showcase the volumes and destinations of Brazilian SSDC activities for 
the period 2005–2010 alone and represent the core of the quantitative data of this article. The 
analysis of the Brazilian contribution to cooperation therefore concentrates on the years 2005 to 
2010. Additionally, while other authors have rightly highlighted the recent pluralisation of actors 
in the definition of Brazilian foreign policy and SSDC (Cason and Power 2009) – notably the 
growing role of the civil society (Leite et al. 2014) and of other Brazilian ministries and public 
institutions (Milani and Pinheiro 2013, Milhorance 2013, Anunciato and Marx 2014) - the MRE 
still enjoys a certain independence in its activities (Burges 2014b, Pautasso and Adam 2014). In 
2010, the MRE was still the ministry that spent the most on SSDC (through the ABC), accounting 
for 80% of the SSDC budget (IPEA 2013). For that reason, this article only reflects on the MRE's 
perspective (and also to some extent Lula's own views) through its study of the ABC's activities. 
The aim of this article is therefore to discover the extent to which soft power informed the design 
of Brazilian SSDC, thus reversing its neglect in the academic literature at both the development 
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studies level and the level of the conceptual development of soft power. In contributing to the 
debate by presenting empirical evidence of a state's behaviour in relation to soft power, the article 
first examines to what extent the soft power strategy influenced the organisation of the ABC, 
before going on to study its influence on the substantive content of Brazil’s SSDC.  
Conceptual framework 
Before analysing the extent of the soft power strategy in Brazilian SSDC, this sub-section briefly 
discusses the conceptual framework used in this article. The argument is based on the soft power 
concept, which was first introduced in the 1990s by Joseph Nye. The assumption underlying this 
concept is that, if a state builds a positive image of itself, other states will be drawn to it. Nye refers 
to attraction, Gallarotti to endearment, both of which pertain to co-optation, in opposition to the 
coercive power relationship of the realist paradigm.  
Various observers, such as Bially Mattern (2005) and Kearn (2011), have highlighted the lack of 
clarity in Nye’s notion of soft power when it comes to distinguishing its different manifestations: 
it is considered a natural condition (the country or agent already has a stockpile of values and 
successes, which consequently generates attraction), a behaviour or behavioural outcome (the 
actions a country takes to improve its image) and an outcome (the power that is translated into 
legitimacy and credibility given by the subject). Because Nye introduces two levels of soft power 
by viewings a country's attraction as both a natural condition and a social construct, there has been 
little analytical development regarding the role of actors and the 'how' of soft power (Lukes 2005). 
This article addresses this analytical limitation of Nye’s concept by exploring the 'how' of soft 
power through one actor's behaviour, namely Brazil's conceptualisation of the soft power 
currencies of 'brilliance', 'beauty' and 'benignity' in pursuing SSDC. Indeed, because the difference 
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between soft and hard power relates not to the tangibility of the resources but to the context of 
their use (Gallarotti 2011), Vuving (2009) distinguishes between power resources (which can be 
used in both hard and soft forms) and power currencies (a property that generates power). For 
Vuving, soft power has three generic power currencies: beauty, benignity and brilliance. The 
'beauty' currency represents the country's values and ideals, which ultimately generate credibility 
and legitimacy. 'Benignity' as a soft power currency is what one might call generosity and altruism 
towards other countries or groups. Finally 'brilliance' mirrors the success of a country, whether by 
virtue of its military might, its powerful economy or its blissful culture or peaceful society. All 
these currencies contribute to soft empowerment.  
 
This article presents evidence indicating that the search for soft power informs the design of 
Brazil’s development cooperation as an aspect of its foreign policy. While, as a middle power, 
Brazil's foreign policy has used other soft power resources8 to acquire a positive image of itself, a 
particular emphasis was placed on its development cooperation under Lula's administration9. The 
article studies especially Brazilian technical cooperation because of the priority given to SSDC. 
The analysis is therefore of the extent of the search for soft power in Lula's government’s framing 
and conceptualisation of its SSDC. It does not look at how Brazil is perceived by the beneficiaries 
of this cooperation. While studies have examined the results of this soft power strategy in terms of 
international representation10 and support11, or in terms of the image that has been created,12 very 
few studies have looked at how Brazil conceived its foreign policy with the objective of creating 
or maintaining soft power13. This relates to one aspect of the soft power concept that has so far 
received minimal attention, namely the role and importance of the agent's behaviour in its soft 
empowerment, in this case, Brazil's behaviour14. To study this behaviour, the article draws on 
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Vuving's idea of soft power currencies to characterise the strategy used by Brazil in the design and 
implementation of its development cooperation.  
INFLUENCE OF BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY ON ITS 
COOPERATION AGENCY 
The Lula Government’s Solidarity Discourse on SSDC 
One of the most significant illustrations of Brazil's development cooperation as an instrument of 
its foreign policy is that it was one of the first non-traditional countries to create an agency 
dedicated to SSC (Correa 2010). Since the Brazilian cooperation agency (ABC) falls under the 
administration of the MRE (Ayllon and Surasky 2010), Brazil’s SSDC has been seen as a tool of 
its foreign policy (Abdenur 2007, Cabral and Weinstock 2010, Puente 2010, Dauvergne and Farias 
2012), in accordance with its soft-power strategy of acquiring better visibility and legitimacy 
internationally (Hirst 2012). On the ABC website, SSDC is described as 'an important instrument 
of foreign policy, which Brazil uses to ensure a positive and growing presence in countries and 
regions of primary interest15'. To ensure this 'positive presence', Brazil proclaims that its SSDC 
has no financial aspect or commercial ties, is demand-driven and horizontal16, is not conditional 
on government reforms, and involves capacity-building and knowledge transfer alone (ABC 2006, 
IPEA 2010), thus in keeping with SSC principles17.  This claim of belonging to the SSC movement 
is an aspect that gives Brazil the image of a promoter of Southern rights, the identity of a Southern 
nation and an image of altruism, all contributing to the 'beauty' and 'benignity' soft power 
currencies. This identity can be traced back to Lula's first mandate, where the accent was placed 
on recapturing the South's, and more specifically Brazil's self-confidence, or what the Brazilian 
government referred to as 'auto-estima'18 (Silva et al. 2003, Silva 2003). 
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When they were asked the reasons for Brazil's engagement in SSDC, the interviewees from IPEA, 
ABC and Itamaraty gave the following responses: 1) the importance of maintaining good relations 
with the greatest number of countries; 2) cooperation as the only means of safeguarding Brazil 
internationally, given its geographical position away from the Western world and its language 
barrier with its neighbours; 3) the link with the diplomatic ambition of acquiring a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council; 4) the importance of contradicting any neo-imperialist discourse 
against the country’s activities on the international scene; and, overall, 5) to stabilise other 
countries’ economies in order to create future markets for Brazilian goods. According to these 
statements, Brazil has mixed motives for engaging in SSDC from both the political and economic 
points of view. However, it is important to note that the safeguarding of Brazil's interests is 
achieved through a long-term strategy using the notion of solidarity in its development cooperation, 
and not using hard power resources. The first and fourth objectives reflect a soft-power strategy 
that aims primarily at constructing a good image internationally19. One high-ranking official from 
IPEA put it more bluntly: 'the Brazilian discourse held in G77 meetings and G20 is different. Brazil 
is acting like a child that came from a poor area and moved to a rich neighbourhood and tried to 
be part of a new group and then has his car vandalised by his old friends. This is why Brazil needs 
to give a positive image to avoid the “neo-imperialism” critics from Southern countries.' In other 
words, there is a need for Brazil to make sure that its development cooperation is seen by the 
'recipients' of that cooperation as a model that is distinct from the Northern model and that its 
actions are seen as motivated by Southern solidarity, thus reinforcing the 'benignity' currency. This 
is explained by the fact that the Brazilian government can sense that its position as a Southern 
country is changing due to Brazil's recent economic development. Therefore, Brazil has to show a 
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stronger commitment to SSDC and the implementation of its principles to emphasise its continued 
belonging to the 'South'. 
 
In the official discourses of Lauro Moreira and Marco Farani (ex-Directors of ABC under Lula), 
Celso Amorim (Foreign Minister, 2003-2010), Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (Secretary General of 
Foreign Affairs, 2003-2009) and President Lula on dealing with SSC, development cooperation is 
said to be based on solidarity and to work in the partners’ mutual interests, emphasizing that Brazil 
is not a hegemonic power and will not repeat past mistakes (Amorim 2003, Silva 2003, Silva et al. 
2003, MRE 2008, Ayllon and Leite 2010). As discussed earlier, soft power is created or maintained 
by projecting a good image, and, when it comes to international cooperation, the stress on non-
colonial aspirations is essential to reach that objective. In 2005 Lula's opening speech at the first 
meeting of the Community of South American Nations' heads of states stressed this rhetoric of 
solidarity by taking the example of Brazil's actions in Haiti, emphasising its respect for Haitian 
wishes and condemning any neo-imperialist presence in the devastated country: 'We reject the 
superiority and arrogance typical of those who have nostalgia for colonial adventures. We know 
that it is the Haitians' prerogative alone to decide their future'20 (MRE 2008, 60). When it comes 
to Africa, this solidarity discourse is enhanced by a stress on partnership and understanding of the 
African situation, itself generating the power currency of 'beauty' in terms of the ideals of a more 
equal and united world. Lula displayed this narrative at his opening ceremony speech at the 13th 
African Union Assembly in July 2009: 'Brazil is not coming to Africa to expiate the guilt of a 
colonial past; neither do we see Africa as a large reserve of natural wealth to be exploited. Brazil 
wishes to be a partner in development projects; we wish to share lessons and experiences, to join 
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forces and unite our abilities. This is the only way in which we can become actors and not merely 
victims in transforming the present world order' (MRE 2010b, 131). 
Lula talked about 'brotherhood', while Chancellor Amorim referred to 'solidarity' in explaining 
Brazil's cooperation activities (MRE 2010b). Both terms point to the soft power currency of 
'benignity' because of the message of altruism this 'solidarity' discourse carries with it. Already at 
the beginning of his first mandate (2003-2007), Lula announced that solidarity would be an 
important aspect of his foreign policy when he said: 'We do not want to establish any hegemonic 
relationships. We want to establish partnerships, companionships, to be generous with those who 
are poorer than us, to be loyal to those who are bigger than us and, in fact, to be a partner of all 
countries around the world'21 (Silva 2003). During Lula's second mandate (which officially ended 
the first of January 2011), Foreign Minister Amorim made the soft power strategy more explicit. 
The objective of the foreign policy of solidarity is even more clearly expressed by projecting the 
notion of a 'humane' Brazil as a vector of long-term benefit to Brazil and showcasing a shining 
example of a soft power strategy: 'We are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a 
sense of humanity that favours the promotion of development of the poorest and most vulnerable 
will not only be good to peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil 
herself, in political as well as economic terms' (Amorim 2010, 225). Thus the motivation behind 
Brazil's involvement in SSDC is geared towards creating and/or maintaining a positive image, this 
image being perceived as having consequences for Brazil's political and economic capacity. Rather 
than using direct forms of coercion or inducement to create markets and exercise its political power, 
Brazil is engaging in a long-term strategy with this positive image. 
This is also reflected in the definition of SSDC on the ABC website, where technical cooperation 
and horizontal cooperation are used interchangeably and stated as framed by the 'solidarity' foreign 
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policy. A report from IPEA (2010) explains that Brazil aims to cooperate in response to a partner 
country’s requests, rather than looking for cooperation opportunities. This demand-driven 
approach, together with the principle of horizontality, has led to the terms 'donor' and 'recipient' 
being excised from Brazil’s jargon of cooperation (Puente 2010), which places the emphasis 
instead on the way in which Brazilian cooperation actors should address the 'recipients' of Brazil’s 
cooperation, thus making an implicit distinction from North-South Cooperation practices. This 
observation was also repeatedly made during the interviews conducted for this research: it is 
important for Brazilian development actors, as well as for southern 'recipients', that in cooperating 
they act towards one another and are treated like partners, strengthening Brazil's 'beauty' currency. 
Translation of the Official Discourse in the ABC's Structure and Functioning 
The element of partnership between Brazil and the 'recipients' of its cooperation accompanies the 
model of cooperation the ABC is claiming to apply. The horizontality and the demand-driven 
approaches have been among the main demands of development cooperation for which 
'recipients'22 have been asking for more than a decade. If Brazil was to apply them in its projects, 
one result would be the improvement in Brazil's image as a cooperation partner, thus contributing 
to its soft empowerment. Already, as a discourse, it situates Brazil as a 'donor' that understands the 
claims of the 'recipient' countries.  
High-ranking officials and managers of the different institutions selected for interviews described 
the development project cycle in detail. This process starts with requests for technical cooperation 
sent to ABC (through different channels, as, for example, through presidential visits, international 
divisions or the form available on the ABC website). ABC then calls a meeting with national 
experts and representatives from the partner countries to look at the feasibility of the project in 
terms of the budget and the time availability of the Brazilian experts. After a discussion about the 
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project, a cooperation agreement between Brazil and the partner country is signed as the foundation 
for the project document. As this process is described, the Brazilian project cycle tends to confirm 
that Brazilian projects follow SSC principles in the way they respect the horizontal and demand-
driven approaches. As a matter of fact, these are the steps in the project cycle that Correa (2010) 
recommends southern countries should follow if they want to apply the horizontality discourse. 
He continues by saying that this approach is essential to avoid a divergence between discourse and 
reality which may be damaging to the 'donor' country’s image if it were to claim horizontality but 
would in practice be in control of its own assistance.  
While the solidarity discourse underlines respect for the demand-driven approach, the ABC 
received guidelines from the MRE in 2002 and 2004 (Puente 2010) setting out the project’s 
priorities: 
- prioritizing projects that have the additional function of expanding a positive image externally; 
- choosing countries 1) with which agreements were made during presidential trips; 2) in South 
America; 3) Haiti; 4) in Africa, especially PALOPs;23 5) other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries; 6) in the CPCP24; and 7) under triangular cooperation. 
 
In terms of soft power, the first priority exemplifies the use of SSDC to raise Brazil’s profile, the 
primary objective being the creation of 'a positive image externally'. Thus, the Brazilian authorities 
select which projects will be carried out, altering the meaning of the demand-driven approach and 
possibly the relevance and appropriateness of the projects. However, the list of the country's 
priorities is so long that, even if the ABC made a selection from among the requests for technical 
cooperation, it would still look like no discrimination was being applied. This long list of priorities 
gives Brazil significant flexibility and enables the ABC to explain all its technical cooperation 
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projects as being conceived as solidarity with SSDC. Therefore, the guidelines do not target short-
term and visible commercial interests but rather emphasise the solidarity discourse.  Burges comes 
to the same conclusions: 'there is a clear sense within the foreign ministry and presidency that 
South-South cooperation is not being strategically positioned to boost individual bilateral 
relationships, but rather formed an important strut of Lula’s international platform of a Southern 
solidarity approach to mutual development' (Burges 2012, 237). 
While the share of ABC's budget in the MRE's budget is relatively low (0.05% in 2001 and 2.1% 
in 2010), it is important to note that the ABC's share steadily increased after 2003 (see trend Graph 
1). There was a 400% increase in its budgetary allocation between 2004 and 2005, and ABC's 
budget went from R$ 4.5 million in 2003 when Lula took office to R$ 52 million in 2010, the 
MRE's budget 'only' doubling during the same period. This is a significant increase, and it 
showcases the growing importance of the ABC for the MRE and the priority given to SSDC.  
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Graph 1. Evolution of ABC budget share of the MRE’s budget (2001-2010)
 
Source: Author. Multiple sources were used: for the years 2001-2005 (Puente 2010, 295), for the ABC budget for the years 2006-
2010 (Cabral and Weinstock 2010, 4), for the MRE’s authorized budget resources (Brasil 2007-2008-2010-2011). Note that the 
data for 2008 are missing. 
In conclusion to this section, it is clear that one of the ambitions highlighted in the political 
guidelines and in the interviewees' narratives was obtaining a positive image of Brazil in those 
countries where the projects were developed by using the 'beauty' and 'benignity' currencies. This 
was ensured by an increase in the ABC's budget and the use of a solidarity discourse attached to 
the idea of a common Southern development detached from any conditions where 'partnership' is 
one of the watchwords. The following section considers the influence of the political guidelines 
over the ABC's activities.  
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THE MANIFESTATIONS OF SOFT POWER IN BRAZILIAN 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACTIVITIES 
The Steady Increase in SSDC Projects 
This section deals with the extent of the influence of Brazil's soft power strategy on its 
development cooperation activities. The overall figure for the Brazilian contribution to 
international development between 2005 and 2009 was BRL 2.9 billion, or close to USD 1.4 billion 
(IPEA 2010) and reached BRL 1.6 billion, or close to USD 923 million, in 2010 alone (IPEA 
2013). 76% of the first figure and 66.3% of the second went to multilateral institutions; the rest 
was distributed in humanitarian assistance, scholarships and technical cooperation. While 
humanitarian assistance and scholarships also contribute to setting a positive image25, this section 
will only look at the external contribution to development cooperation in cases where Brazil can 
directly influence its actions and where cooperation is explicitly used as a tool of its foreign policy 
(Cabral et al. 2013), namely technical cooperation.  
The total amount of technical cooperation for 2009 was close to BRL 98 million, which 
corresponded at the time of the study to nearly USD 57 million. This relatively low figure 
(compared to an overall international development budget of around USD 421 million the same 
year) is explained by the fact that Brazil does not transfer money in its SSDC activities. Brazilian 
legislation does not allow public money to be transferred to other countries’ governments (World 
Bank and IPEA 2012), and for that reason it has only focused on capacity development and 
technical knowledge transfer since the 1960s (Costa Vaz and Inoue 2007). It is also evident from 
the World Bank and IPEA table (2012, 37) that Brazil tries to avoid direct transfers of money as 
much as possible, not only because of the legal restriction mentioned above, but also because it is 
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the transfer of knowledge that is at the core of the Brazilian solidarity discourse. One of the authors 
of the IPEA report added in an interview that this fact alone proves that Brazil can hardly corrupt 
or condition its assistance since no money is involved. He continued by saying that this shows that 
Brazil concentrates on its solidarity objective and has no hidden agenda. However, as already 
discussed, this solidarity objective forms part of the country's long-term objective of obtaining a 
positive image, which is an agenda in itself. One has to understand that ABC only covers flight 
ticket fares and per diems, the rest of the technical activity, the expertise, being borne by the 
Brazilian public institution that is the partner to the project. Studies show that if the costs of this 
expertise were integrated into the overall project costs, the latter would have to be multiplied by 
ten (Schläger 2007) or even fifteen (Costa Vaz and Inoue 2007). This loss of productivity (and 
thus of profit) for the public entity supports this solidarity discourse because of the generosity this 
loss illustrates in its cooperation activities (thus contributing to the 'benignity' currency). But it 
also represents a serious problem of sustainability for Brazilian entities, considering that they very 
often do not have an international mandate and that the number of requests for projects is 
increasing.   
In terms of technical cooperation projects, it is important to note that between 2005 and 2009 the 
share of technical cooperation and humanitarian assistance increased six-fold, while Brazil’s 
contribution to multilateral institutions 'only' doubled (IPEA 2010). The budget allocated to 
technical cooperation went from BRL 27 million in 2005 to BRL 101 million in 2010. This reflects 
the strategy of acquiring a positive image through SSDC and thus soft power. What is interesting 
is that managers and high-ranking officials from IPEA and Itamaraty made a different analysis of 
this increase, seeing it more as a result of soft power than as thought-through behaviour on the part 
of Brazil. Indeed, they explain this increase in technical cooperation as residual to the successes 
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of the Brazilian government in its public policies. These successes would create such a high level 
of attraction that the number of cooperation requests would increase accordingly. A high-ranking 
official at Itamaraty explained: 'Succeeding in your project brings you a good image. (…) For 
instance, Brazil still has a lot of inequality, so our public policies need to be adaptable to the whole 
of Brazil. That way we can relate to other developing countries. (…) The more our programmes 
were successful, the more requests we received.' This explanation was also given by the ex-director 
of the Energy Department at the MRE about the increase in biofuel projects because of Brazil's 
world leadership in that technology (Ferreira Simoes 2008). This element brings a subtle 
complexity to the understanding of soft power: here the increase in the number of technical 
cooperation projects is seen as the result of successful programmes in Brazil, an example of the 
soft power currency of 'brilliance'. While this element is valid, the subject here is the country’s 
behaviour: it is one thing to be successful at something, but quite another to agree to transfer this 
knowledge or technical capacity without conditions attached. In this respect, soft power is 
expressed as behaviour in the way Brazil has decided to transfer knowledge and capacities and to 
increase its budget for 'solidarity' projects – an example, therefore, of the power currency of 
'benignity'.  
The recent IPEA report (2013) counts a budget of USD 58 million for technical cooperation in 
2010, a number very close to and consistent with the figures for 2009. According to a presentation 
given by the current Director of the ABC, Fernando Marroni de Abreu (Marroni de Abreu 2012), 
in 2011 the agency spent approximately USD 26 million in technical cooperation activities and 
has committed itself to fund projects worth up to USD 80.5 million for the period 2012-2015. 
Already in 2012, Brazil was participating in 149 projects in Latin America alone (SEGIB 2014). 
It should be noted that Lula's mandate ended in January 2011. The new president, Dilma Rousseff, 
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has introduced a change in foreign policy priorities regarding development assistance and reduced 
the budget dedicated to SSDC projects (Leite et al. 2014). 
The Worldwide Presence of Brazilian Technical Cooperation 
Under Lula, there was a clear tendency to increase the number of development cooperation projects. 
Figure 1 shows that since 2005 Africa has received a larger share every year, though it now seems 
to have stabilized, culminating in an equal share to Latin America’s in 2009. Figure 1 also provides 
a clear overview of the constant increase in Brazilian contributions to SSDC between 2005 and 
2010. Unfortunately, the IPEA data do not provide the distribution to countries for the years 2005 
to 2009, making it difficult to analyse Brazil’s priorities within the Latin America and Caribbean 
region (which represents 33 countries). However, the 2010 IPEA report specified the 99 countries 
in which Brazil implemented projects: 47 African countries, 17 in Central America and the 
Caribbean, 11 in South America, 11 in the Middle East, 9 in Asia and 4 in Europe. For a 
cooperation agency that has a limited budget at its disposal, the number of 'assisted' countries is 
significant and the potential influence of the 'benignity' currency multiplied. The spread of 
activities does give a sense that specific countries are not targeted, even though Latin America and 
the Caribbean and Africa have the largest share of Brazilian cooperation in financial terms, these 
two regions representing 83% of project costs (not surprisingly, since the two regions represent 
75% of the 'assisted' countries). This is also consistent with a soft power strategy involving 
solidarity, that is, targeting a maximum of partners by applying the following logic: the greater the 
number, the better for visibility. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Brazilian Development Cooperation in Africa and Latin America and the 
Caribbean between 2005 and 2010 
 
Source: author, based on IPEA reports (2010, 2013). 
 
Figure 2 shows the first ten sectors of technical cooperation for 2010, from cooperation in areas 
like communications to health programmes. Government and civil society, and the health and 
agricultural sectors, represent 70% of all technical cooperation projects. The spread in the activities 
covered can also be explained by the demand-driven approach Brazil claims to follow, making it 
impossible to prioritise sectors of assistance. The share given to health was explained by one of 
Fiocruz’s international cooperation managers as the result of the implementation of the solidarity 
discourse: 'Fiocruz is following exactly the same principles and values of solidarity written into 
our constitution. (…) The international health agenda is quite full and aspires to solidarity in 
political discourse, but also and mainly in practice. This is what Brazil and Fiocruz are also looking 
for.' 
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Figure 2. First ten sectors by project share of Brazilian Technical Cooperation in 2010  
 
Source: author, based on AidData website database (www.aiddata.org). 
 
In Latin America, Brazil is the country that has contributed the most in terms of the number of 
projects since 2009 (SEGIB 2009-2010-2011-2012-2014), double the share of Argentina and triple 
the share of Mexico, these being respectively the second and third providers of cooperation in 
Latin America (SEGIB 2012). Brazil has also been the top cooperation actor in terms of financial 
contributions three years in a row (SEGIB 2009-2010-2011). Together with Mexico, it is the Latin 
American country with the greatest diversity of cooperation recipients and partners (SEGIB 2012-
2014, Ayllon and Surasky 2010), mirroring the ABC guidelines that the maximum number of 
countries should be targeted and as many cooperation requests as possible answered. It also shows 
how Brazil stands out in its region and the relative priority it gives to SSDC compared to other 
South American providers, since development cooperation in Latin America mainly consists of 
capacity-building activities (and therefore is not linked to the 'donor’s' economic capacity). 
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Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa covers the health, education and agriculture sectors (de 
Mello e Souza 2012). The CGEE interviewee pointed that: 'Unlike China and India, Brazil is not 
over-populated, not limited in terms of natural resources. On the other hand, Brazil needs a market'. 
In this respect, Brazil intends to create or maintain a good image in the longer term by covering 
sectors that have greater visibility and 'impact' locally, such as HIV prevention and medication or 
'Bolsa Familia'-type projects. This social element promotes an image of altruism, an example of 
the power currency of 'benignity'. According to Amamor (2013), Brazilian SSDC establishes 
diplomatic ties that stress symmetric relations or soft power, which, contrary to cooperation made 
conditional on institutional reforms, eventually facilitates investment and business exchange. 
Amamor (2013) therefore reflects the long-term strategy of soft power and Brazil's ultimate 
motivations in SSDC: the solidarity diplomacy will ultimately have an impact on Brazil's economic 
interests in the beneficiary countries. These symmetric relations engage with a narrative on the 
similarity of climate and environment, the transferability of Brazilian technology to the African 
context, a common identity with the African diaspora in Brazil, and a moral debt linked to the 
history of slavery (Chicahava et al. 2013b). When looking specifically at African projects in Figure 
3, Brazilian projects in 2010 were concentrated in the health, government and civil society, 
agriculture and education sectors (which combined represented 75% of all projects).  
22 
 
Figure 3. Sector allocation in Africa in 2010 by project share
 
Source: author, based on AidData website database (www.aiddata.org). 
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successes in HIV projects in Africa explain the increasing cooperation requests received by the 
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is not specific to Brazil, it shows that Brazilian 'solidarity' projects have the additional objective 
of creating or maintaining a visually good image among their 'recipients'. 
Though it is not a topic of discussion here, the solidarity image of the technical projects must of 
course be moderated when looking at Brazil’s commercial loans and trade in Africa. It seems that 
national reconstruction projects in Africa financed by Brazilian commercial loans through the 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) prioritise Brazilian construction and engineering 
companies (Masagão et al. 2012). Already Mozambique, one of the first Brazilian SSDC recipients 
in Africa, is increasingly a destination for Brazilian private capital (Chichava et al. 2013a). 
Between 2005 and 2009, debt cancellation, concessional export credits and financing food supplies 
amounted to more than USD 2.5 billion (Cabral 2011). If financial and commercial cooperation 
were included in the contributions to development cooperation, they would represent 62% of 
Brazil's cooperation contribution (Masagão et al. 2012).   
That said, in the eyes of the Brazilian public authorities there is a clear distinction between 
international development cooperation and loans and credits (Cabral 2011). This is particularly 
emphasised in the IPEA report when the authors state in the methodology section that export 
credits are excluded from the calculation as well as the financial flows with a 25% grant element 
(the latter being nevertheless included in the OECD-ODA). Thus, the Brazilian government seems 
to follow two different strategies in its trade and investment activities and its development projects: 
one consists of reinforcing the commercial ties with other developing countries, while the other 
embodies the development of Brazil's soft power. This is confirmed in a report drawn up by 
Kaplinsky and Farooki (2009) for the UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa. Having 
examined the presence of Brazilian institutions in Africa in particular, the authors conclude: 
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'Countries receiving the majority of aid are not the same as those receiving FDI, nor are there 
commonalities between major trade and FDI partners' (Kaplinsky and Farooki 2009, 42). 
The fact that debt cancellations and international loans and credits are kept out of the international 
development calculation reflects the priority given by the Brazilian government to persist with the 
solidarity discourse in its technical cooperation activities. As clearly stated by Amorim (2010), 
SSDC is a foreign policy tool used to strengthen relations with other developing countries which 
will ultimately favour Brazil's economy. To avoid any neo-imperialist accusations, a clear line has 
been drawn between SSDC activities and financial and economic cooperation. Nonetheless, there 
has been a change of perspective in Brazilian SSDC in Africa. Recent studies have shown a link 
to exist between commercial interests and development projects, so that the demand-driven and 
horizontality approaches have been disregarded. Indeed, the agriculture sector in SSDC has been 
criticised for not pursuing a 'solidarity' agenda alone. For instance, in Mozambique it led to civil 
society describing one programme as a ‘Trojan horse of Brazilian economic interest’ because it 
manifested disputable demand-driven implementation (Chichava et al. 2013a, Nogueira and 
Ollinaho 2013). Pinho (2013) sees Brazil’s rhetoric on solidarity and horizontality as a means to 
mask the capitalist expansion of Brazil in Africa. In fact, although this tendency to hide 
commercial interests within SSDC projects in Africa contradicts the solidarity discourse, it is 
consistent with Rousseff's policy of merging technical cooperation and trade (Rousseff 2013). For 
Cabral and Shankland (2013), the combination of solidarity and commercial interest reflects two 
different approaches to international relations within the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), where the 
narratives are situated between a soft power perspective involving a moral and ethical presence in 
Africa and a push from Brazilian companies to pursue commercially interesting projects. However, 
due to a lack of data after 2010, the possible change in the priorities of Brazilian SSDC could not 
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be investigated. Since no official report on Brazilian technical cooperation after 2010 has been 
released, the possible change in Brazil's foreign policy regarding the objectives behind the use of 
SSDC will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis through project case studies. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis informed by the interviews and official reports shows that Lula's government used 
the solidarity discourse in its SSDC with the objective of obtaining or maintaining a good image 
in the 'recipient' countries, thus showcasing an example of a country's behaviour as an agent of its 
soft power. There exist many ways for a country to strategize its influence on its soft empowerment: 
the USA's military cooperation (Nye 2004), Norway through its peace diplomacy (Nye 2008) or 
China through its cultural diplomacy (Lee 2010), for example. Brazil's soft power strategy, in 
targeting SSDC, adds to the list of soft power options chosen by states in their soft empowerment 
efforts. While it is clearly stated that the ultimate objectives are to secure Brazil's political and 
economic positions, the Brazilian government has chosen a long-term soft-power strategy to do so. 
The Brazilian government's behaviour is characterised by the implementation of SSC principles in 
the guidelines and organisation of the ABC, but also by the increase in the ABC's budget. This 
behaviour was manifested in the multiplication of technical cooperation projects that were 
implemented in equal proportions in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean by 2009, as 
well as in the large number of 'recipient' countries. Brazil chose to answer and support more 
'solidarity' development projects (the budget for technical cooperation tripled between 2005 and 
2009) with the aim of reinforcing the 'benignity' soft power currency. Brazil's soft power was also 
described as a result of the success of its national and international programmes (Fome Zero, Bolsa 
Familia, HIV programmes), resulting in an increase in cooperation requests (a 'brilliance' soft 
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power currency manifestation). In terms of organisation, Brazil’s guidelines for development 
cooperation stress the horizontality of the exchanges and the non-financial aspects of its projects. 
These two elements are advertised as confirmation that Brazil does not and cannot tie its 
cooperation to specific commercial agreements and that it does not follow neo-imperialist 
objectives which are linked to the 'beauty' soft power currency. While this article shows that the 
proclaimed respect for 'recipients’' wishes and the solidarity approach of its SSDC play a part in 
Brazil’s soft power strategy, this does not necessarily impact on the 'receiving end'. As explained 
earlier, this article only studies how Brazil (through ABC's SSDC) conceived its soft power 
strategy; it has not considered the 'effectiveness' of this strategy in the recipient countries. 
When looking at the available data regarding Brazilian SSDC projects, one should take into 
account the limitations of the data published by the Brazilian authorities. This 'data gap' highlights 
the need for primary research to shed further light on the exact scope, scale and characteristics of 
Brazilian cooperation activities. In this article, the specification of the data remains at the overview 
level and does not allow an in-depth understanding of the projects' horizontality, which is central 
to the Brazilian government's broader foreign policy discourse. It is therefore necessary to conduct 
studies examining the actual implementation process of Brazilian projects and confronting this 
process with the 'recipients’' perspective, especially since the latest studies of Brazilian technical 
cooperation in Africa show a trade-oriented change in Brazilian SSDC (Chichava et al. 2013a; 
Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013). Cabral et al. (2013) have raised this issue and found that the 
solidarity narrative is paving the way to President Rousseff's trade-oriented perspective of 
cooperation with Africa. Even though President Rousseff cancelled the debts to Brazil of twelve 
African countries last year as a gesture towards the establishment of appeasement and equal 
relations, her declaration on changes to ABC, which will soon be integrated into another agency 
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that will combine technical cooperation, trade and investment, shows a change in the concept of 
cooperation. It seems that the long-term objective of soft power in the solidarity diplomacy has 
been replaced by a short-term strategy directed at guaranteeing Brazil's economic interests now.  
This change will certainly have an impact on the way development projects will be carried out in 
the future and, as a result, on Brazil's image. The distinction between commercial and cooperative 
activities provided Brazil with a positive image and was intended to counter neo-colonialist 
reproaches. However, as explained in the introduction, other Brazilian public and private actors 
are gaining influence in the definition of Brazilian foreign policy. Their role on the future of SSDC 
and therefore on Brazil's image should be investigated.   
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1 For more information about soft power, see Nye 1990; 2008; 2011. 
2 It is important to note here that Burges (2014a) dismisses this categorisation, claiming that the mistake lies in the 
misinterpretation of Brazil's aspirations, which fall much more into the 'major power' category.  
3A long list of alliances demonstrates this ambition: IBSA, BASIC, BRICS, MERCOSUR, UNASUR, G4, and G20. 
4 'Technical cooperation' is the term used by the ABC to refer to SSDC. Throughout the text, 'technical cooperation' 
and 'development cooperation' will be used interchangeably. 
5 Translated from the Portuguese by the author. 
6 Ten high-ranking officials or managers engaged in the international cooperation of Brazilian institutions involved 
in development activities, such as ABC, IPEA, the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty), SENAI, EMBRAPA or FIOCRUZ, 
were interviewed in January 2013. Additionally, academics from the University of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro State 
University and the Centre for Strategic Studies and Management (CGEE) and development cooperation consultants 
were consulted. The selection of the interviewees was based on the positions they held in the respective 
organisations (usually the person in charge of international cooperation) and the work they have published on 
Brazilian development cooperation. The number of interviews was also dependent upon the availability and positive 
responses of the persons contacted. For the sake of clarity, but also because the respondents informed the 
interviewer that they would talk more freely if they knew they would remain anonymous, the interviewees' names 
have not been used here. 
7 See IPEA (2010), IPEA (2013). 
8 Some authors link Brazil’s peace-making operations in Haiti since 2003 and activities in administering HIV 
medication to its interest in gaining prestige and thus producing soft power (Gratius 2007, Kenkel 2010, Petherick 
2011, Vieira and Alden 2011). 
9 The threefold increase of the budget allocated to Brazil’s technical cooperation between 2005 and 2009 is one 
element reflecting this priority. 
10 A report by the World Bank and IPEA (2012) linked Brazilian SSDC and trade in Africa to the selection of Brazil 
as host of the World Cup and the Olympics, the appointment of Brazilian citizens as the new directors of the FAO 
and the WTO, and large African votes for Brazil's claim to a permanent seat at the UNSC. 
11 Goncalves Rosi (2012) exemplifies the result of this soft power strategy by referring to the fact that Brazil, along 
with Japan, has been elected to the UN Security Council (UNSC) more than any other member state. In another 
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study, Puente (2010) shows that almost all recipients of Brazilian SSDC support Brazil's claim for a permanent seat 
on the UNSC. 
12 Academics maintain that Brazil has gained an image as a promoter of southern countries' rights (Soares de Lima 
and Hirst 2006, Saraiva 2007, Amorim 2010, dos Santos 2011, Ayllon 2012). 
13 Burges (2008) has touched on the subject of Brazil's co-optation, using a critical theory approach to foreign policy 
through what he calls 'consensual hegemony'.   
14 Gallarotti (2010) refers to soft empowerment as the result of the level of attraction produced. 
15 Translated from the Portuguese by the author. 
16 Meaning equality of partnership between two countries in the design and implementation of a project or 
programme. 
17 The guiding principles that can be found in the literature are that it is non-conditional, works on the basis of 
mutual benefit, is demand-driven, brings together practical know-how relating to similar socio-cultural and 
economic backgrounds, and operates in a horizontal manner (Bandung Conference 1955, UN-CTCDC 1978,Bobiash 
1992, Chahoud 2007, Davies 2008, Rowlands 2008, UN-ECOSOC 2008, Fordelone 2009, SEGIB 2009, South 
Centre 2009, SU-SSC 2009, UNDP 2009, Better Aid 2010, Ladd 2010, Sanahuja 2010, SEGIB 2010, TT-SSC 2010, 
UNCTAD 2010, Chandy and Kharas 2011, Park 2011, SEGIB 2011, Zimmermann and Smith 2011). 
18 For more information about auto-estima, see Burges, 2005. 
19 The other objectives are not studied in this article, because the second pertains to geopolitical considerations, and 
the third and fifth are rather preferred outcomes of this foreign policy engagement. 
20 Translated from the Portuguese by the author. 
21 Translated from the Portuguese by the author. 
22 See discussions about the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action or the Busan Partnership Agreement, 
for example, in Schulz 2008 and Mawdsley et al. 2013. 
23 'Portuguese-speaking African countries' or in its Portuguese version 'Países Africanos de Língua Oficial 
Portuguesa'. 
24 'Community of Portuguese Language Countries' or in its Portuguese version 'Comunidade dos Países de Língua 
Oficial Portuguesa'. 
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25 Brazil’s peace-keeping operations are also part of its soft power strategy (Kenkel 2010). Nye (2008) defined peace 
diplomacy as a form of soft power that is followed by the Norwegian government, for example.  
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